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Message Text

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INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02

INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15

USIA-06 IO-13 SAM-01 ACDA-07 AID-05 EA-07 NEA-10 EB-07

TRSE-00 COME-00 OMB-01 ARA-06 /124 W
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R 311120Z AUG 76
FM AMEMBASSY MAPUTO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4956
INFO AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY GABORONE
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
AMEMBASSY LILONGWE
AMENBASSY MBABANE
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MAPUTO 0978

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, GPEN, EAID, MZ, ZA, TA, RH, SA
SUBJECT: MOZAMBIQUE ASSESSMENT (5): FOREIGN POLICY GOALS AND PERFORMANCE

REF: A(A) MAPUTO 886; (B) MAPUTO 939; (C) MAPUTO 909

1. SUMMARY: FRELIMO CAME OUT OF ITS TEN YEAR STRUGGLE AGAINST PORTUGAL WITH A CLEAR NOTION OF ITS FRIENDS AND ENEMIES. ITS FRIENDS WERE THOSE WHO HAD HELPED IN THE STRUGGLE: TANZANIA, TO A LESSER EXTENT ZAMBIA, THE PRC, THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER COMMUNIST COUNTRIES, AS WELL AS A HANDFUL OF "PRO-GRESSIVE COUNTRIES" (SCANDINAVIANS, NETHERLANDS). ITS ENEMIES WERE THE "IMPERIALIST, NEO-COLONIALIST AND
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CAPITALIST" COUNTRIES OF THE WEST. ALTHOUGH THE

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GPRM HAS ENTERED INTO DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ALL THE MAJOR WESTERN COUNTRIES, IT MAINTAINS FAR MORE CORDIAL RELATIONS WITH ITS "FRIENDS" AND SUPPORTS THEM ON ALMOST ALL INTERNATIONAL ISSUES. IT REMAINS SUSPICIOUS OF THE WEST AND IS STRIDENTLY CRITICAL OF U.S. AND WESTERN POLICIES. RELATIONS WITH THE FORMER METROPOLE, PORTUGAL, HAVE BEEN POOR. THE OVERRIDING FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS OF THE GPRM ARE RHODESIA AND SOUTHERN AFRICA, WHERE IT SEEKS RAPID MAJORITY RULE UNDER REVOLUTIONARY LEADERSHIP. IT HAS BEEN WILLING TO BEAR THE COST OF CLOSING ITS BORDER WITH RHODESIAWN BUT HAS CONTINUED ITS IMPORTANT COMMERCIAL LINKS WITH SOUTH AFRICA, TO WHOSE APARTHEID SYSTEM IT REMAINS UNALTERABLY OPPOSSED. END SUMMARY.

2. GENERAL PRINCIPLES: THE GOVERNMENT OF MOZAMBIQUE HAS ADOPTED A RADICAL ANTI-WESTERN FOREIGN POLICY. IT BELIEVES THAT THE MOST SERIOUS THREAT TO THE INDEPENDENCE OF MOZAMBIQUE AND OTHER THIRD WORD COUNTRIES IS IMPERIALISM, A TERM USED TO DESCRIBE THE FOREIGN AND ECONOMIC POLICIES OF WESTERN CAPITALIST COUNTRIES. IN INTERNATIONAL FORA, MOZAMBIQUE HAS JOINED THE THIRD WORLD RADICALS ON MOST ISSUES: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INDIAN OCEAN ZONE OF PEACE; THE WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN FORCES FROM KOREA AND REUNIFICATION OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA UNDER NORTH KOREAN CONTROL: INDEPENDENCE FOR PUERTO RICO: AND THE EXPULSION OF ISRAEL FROM THE UN.

3. HAVING ITSELF COME TO POWER THROUGH THE FORCE OF ARMS, THE GPRM SHARES AN AFFINITY WITH OTHER REVOLUTIONARY REGIMES LIKE THOSE IN ALGERIA AND VIETNAM AND IS DEEPLY COMMITTED TO PROMOTING PROGRESSIVE REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLES AND PARTIES AROUND THE WORLD. CURRENTLY, THE GPRM RECOGNIZES AND ESPOUSES THE CAUSES OF SUCH DISPARATE REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS AS FRETILIN (EAST TIMOR), THE POLISARIO FRONT (EX-SPANISH SAHARA), THE PLO, SWAPO AND THE ANC
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(SOUTH AFRICA).

4. RELATIONS WITH THE WEST: MOZAMBIQUE HAS DIPLOMCATIC RELATIONS WITH ALL OF THE MAJOR WESTERN GOVERNMENTS, BUT THERE HAS BEEN NO LET-UP IN THE CRITICISM OF WESTERN POLICIES. THE U.S. HAS BEEN THE PRINCIPAL TARGET. FRANCE HAS ALSO COME UNDER ATTACK FOR ITS CONTINUED PRESENCE IN DJIBOUTI, FOR DE-

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TACHING MAYOTTE FROM THE COMOROS, AND FOR SELLING ARMS AND MOST RECENTLY A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS. ALTHOUGH OTHER WESTERN GOVERNMENTS HAVE NOT BEEN HAMMERED AS HARD, THEY HAVE LIKEWISE BEEN LUMPED TOGETHER WITH THE U.S. AND FRANCE IN THE "CAPITALIST CAMP," A CATEGORY RESERVED FOR THE "ENEMY."

5. THE SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES AND THE NETHERLANDS HAVE ENJOYED MUCH BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE GPRM THAN OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES. THROUGHOUT THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE, SOCIALIST PARTIES FROM THESE COUNTRIES SUPPORTED FRELIMO POLITICALLY AND FINANCIALLY, AND THEY HAVE CONTINUED TO DO SO. SWEDEN IS CURRENTLY MOZAMBIQU'S LARGEST AID DONOR, WITH NORWAY, DENMARK AND THE NETHERLANDS ALSO CONTRIBUTING GENEROUSLY.

6. RELATIONS WITH PORTUGAL: MOZAMBIQUE'S RELATIONS WITH LISBON HAVE WAXED AND WANED AS BOTH COUNTRIES HAVE SOUGHT TO FASHION A NEW RELATIONSHIP AFTER FIVE HUNDRED YEARS OF COLONIALSM. CRITICISMS OF PORTUGAL STILL RUNS HIGH HERE AND MACHEL HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT MOZAMBIQUE'S ONLY REAL ALLY IN PORTUGAL IS THE PCP. ALTHOUGH THE GPRM IS PREPARED TO WORK WITH THE NEW SOARES GOVERNMENT, FUTURE RELATIONS WILL CONTINUE TO BE COMPLICATED AS PORTUGAL ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN COMPENSATION FOR THE NATIONALIZED PROPERTY OF ITS CITIZENS AND TO RESOLVE OTHER OUTSTANDING BILATERAL ECONOMIC ISSUES.

7. RELATIONS WITH BLACK AFRICAN STATES: IN AFRICA, THE GPRM HAS STRESSED ITS RELATIONS WITH ITS TWO LARGEST BLACK NEIGHBORS-TANZANIA AND ZAMBIA--AND WITH CONFIDENTIAL

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WHAT IT REGARDS AS THE PROGRESSIVE AFRICAN STATES--SOMALIA, MADAGASCAR, ANGOLA, CONGO, GUINEA (C), GUINEA (B) AND CAPE VERDE--ALL OF WHICH SHARE A STRONG ANTI-WESTERN AND ANTI-IMPERIALIST BIAS. MOZAMBIQUE REGARDS ITS TWO OTHER BLACK AFRICAN NEIGHBORS--MALAWI AND SWAZILAND--AS REACTIONARY REGIMES. RELATIONS WITH OTHER BLACK AFRICAN STATES ARE MINIMAL.

8. TANZANIA: TANZANIA IS THE MOST IMPORTANT AND INFLUENTIAL OF MOZAMBIQUE'S ALLIES. DURING FRELIMO'S TEN YEAR STRUGGLE AGAINST THE PORTUGUESE, TANZANIA WAS FRELIMO'S PRINCIPAL AFRICAN BENEFACTOR AND SANCTUARY, PROVIDING BASES AND EQUIPMENT FOR FRELIMO INSURGENTS, AND ALLOWING FRELIMO TROOPS TO MOVE

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FREELY ACROSS ITS BORDERS. DAR ES SALAAM SERVED
AS FRELIMO'S POLITICAL HEADQUARTERS. FRELIMO
LEADERS HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED THIS DEBT TO TANZANIA.
TANZANIA'S AMBASSADOR WAS THE FIRST DIPLOMAT
ACCREDITED TO THE NEW GOVERNMENT AND PRESIDENT
NYERERE WAS THE FIRST HEAD OF STATE TO PAY A FORMAL
STATE VISIT TO MOZAMBIQUE. MOZAMBIQUE HAS CONTINUED
TO LOOK TO TANZANIA FOR ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
ADVICE, AND TANZANIA HAS SUPPLIED DOCTORS, TEACHERS
AND A LIMITED NUMBER OF TECHNICIANS TO THE GPRM.
THE TANZANIANS HAVE ALSO DESPATCHED MILITARY ADVISORS
AND AT LEAST ONE COMPANY OF TROOPS TO BOLSTER MO-
ZAMBIQUE'S DEFENSE CAPABILITIES.

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INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15

USIA-06 IO-13 SAM-01 ACDA-07 AID-05 EA-07 NEA-10 EB-07

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R 311120Z AUG 76
FM AMEMBASSY MAPUTO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4957
INFO AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
*AMEMBASSY GABORONE 493
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
AMEMBASSY LILONGWE
AMEMBASSY MBABANE
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI

C O N F I B E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 MAPUTO 0978

9. ZAMBIA: WHILE MOZAMBIQUE'S RELATIONS WITH ZAMBIA
ARE CLOSE, ZAMBIA HAS SIGNIFICANTLY LESS INFLUENCE IN

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MAPUTO THAN TANZANIA. THERE ARE PROBABLY TWO REASONS FOR THIS: FIRST, ZAMBIA AND MOZAMBIQUE HAVE DIFFERENT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS, AND SECOND, FRELIMO LEADERS FEEL THAT ZAMBIAN PRESIDENT KENNETH KAUNDA WAS NOT AS HELPFUL TO FRELIMO DURING ITS STRUGGLE AS HE COULD HAVE BEEN. DESPITE THESE PAST AND PRESENT DIFFERENCES, KAUNDA AND MACHEL HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TOGETHER BY A STRONG DESIRE TO BRING DOWN THE SMITH REGIME AND TO STRENGTHEN THEIR ECONOMIC TIES. TO THIS END, MACHEL AND KAUNDA HAVE CONSULTED REGULARLY, BOTH BILATERALLY AND AS PARTICIPANTS IN THE MEETINGS OF THE FOUR FRONT -LINE PRESIDENTS, AND THEIR SECURITY AND DEFENSE ADVISORS HAVE MET FREQUENTLY.
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10. OTHER PROGRESSIVE AFRICAN STATES: MOZAMBIQUE REGARDS ONLY A HANDFUL OF COUNTRIES IN AFRICA--SOMALIA, MADAGASCAR, ANGOLA, CONGO, GUINEA ((:) GUINEA (B) AND CAPE VERDE--AS PROGRESSIVE STATES. SINCE INDEPENDENCE IT HAS SOUGHT TO ESTABLISH FRIENDLY TIES WITH THEM ON THE BASIS OF POLITICAL SOLIDARITY. THERE IS REASON TO BELIEVE THAT MACHEL WOULD ALSO LIKE TO FASHION THESE STATES INTO A PROGRESSIVE BLOC WITHIN THE OAU.

11. RELATIONS WITH WHITE-RULED REGIMES: MOZAMBIQUE IS BORDERED ON THE SOUTH AND THE WEST BY SOUTH AFRICA AND RHODESIA, AND ITS REGIONAL FOREIGN POLICY HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY INFLUENCED BY THIS FACT. WHILE MOZAMBIQUE HAS REACTED DIFFERENTLY TOWARDS THESE TWO REGIMES, ITS LONG-TERM OBJECTIVES ARE THE SAME-TO PROMOTE MAJORITY RULE AND REVOLUTIONARY LEADERSHIP IN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

12. SOUTH AFRICA: DESPITE THE VAST DIFFERENCE IN THEIR POLITICAL PHILOSPHIES AND THE ALMOST DAILY CRITICISMS OF APARTHEID IN THE MOZAMBICAN PRESS, THE GPRM HAS MAINTAINED MOZAMBIQUE'S EXTENSIVE PRE-INDEPENDENCE COMMERCIAL LINKS WITH SOUTH AFRICA. SOUTH AFRICAN AIRWAYS CONTINUES REGULAR SERVICE BETWEEN JOHANNESBURG AND MAPUTO, OVER 50 PERCENT OF THE TRANSVALL'S IMPORTS AND EXPORTS TRANSIT THE PORT OF MAPUTO, LARGE NUMBERS OF MOZAM-BICAN LABORERS ARE STILL RECRUITED FOR WORK IN SOUTH AFRICA'S GOLD MINES, SOUTH AFRICAN TECHNICIANS ARE PROVIDING ASSISTANCE TO THE GOVERN-MENT-OWNED RAILROADS AND PORTS AUTHORITY, AND WHEN CABORA BASSA GOES ON STREAM, MOZAMBIQUE WILL SELL THE BULK OF ITS ELECTRICAL POWER TO SOUTH AFRICA.

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13. ZIMBABWE: THE FOREIGN POLICY ISSUE OF GREATEST CONCERN TO MOZAMBIQUE DURING THE PAST YEAR HAS BEEN RHODESIA. ALTHOUGH THE GPRM REFUSED TO IMPOSE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST THE SMITH REGIME AT IN-DEPENDENCE, PRESIDENT MACHEL AFFIRMED THAT HE WAS CONFIDENTIAL

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COMMITTED TO SUPPORTING THE LIBERATION OF ZIMBABWE AND DECLARED THAT MOZAMBIQUE WOULD NEVER TO FULLY INDEPENDENT UNTIL ZIMBABWE WAS. BACKING UP HIS DECLARATIONS, HE INVITED ZIMBABWEAN INSURGENTS TO USE HIS COUNTRY AS A SANCTUARY AND ALLOWED THEM TO USE MOZAMBIQUE ARMY TRAINING FACILITIES WHEN AN INTENSIFICATION OF THE INSURGENT ACTIVITY INSIDE RHODESIA INCREASED THE FREQUENCY AND SEVERITY OF RHODESIAN ATTACKS ON MOZAMBIQUE, MACHEL (ON MARCH 3), CLOSED HIS COUNTRY'S BORDERS AND BROKE OFF ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH RHODESIA.

14. MACHEL HAS NOT WAVERED FROM HIS BASIC CON-VICTION THAT MAJORITY RULE CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED IN RHODESIA THROUGH ARMED FORCE. AS A RESULT, MOZAMBIQUE'S SUPPORT DURING THE LAST YEAR HAS CRYSTALLIZED AROUND THOSE ZIMBABWEANS WHO HAVE BEEN WILLING TO FIGHT, RATHER THAN NEGOTIATE, FOR INDEPENDENCE. MACHEL WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN FORMING THE THIRD FORCE, PRINCIPALLY A ZANU GROUP, AND IN CONVINCING THE THREE OTHER FRONT-LINE PRESIDENTS, THAT THEY SHOULD SUPPORT A MILITARY SOLUTION TO THE RHODESIAN QUESTION.

15. IT IS ALSO CLEAR FROM MACHEL'S ACTIONS THAT HE SEEKS NOT ONLY AN INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWE, BUT ALSO ONE THAT IS LED BY A PROGRESSIVE AND REVOLUTIONARY LEADER-SHIP LIKE HIS OWN. IN ORDER TO CREATE THE CONDITIONS FOR THIS, HE HAS SPOKEN OF THE NEED FOR A PROTRACTED STRUGGLE WHICH WOULD REVOLUTIONIZE THE ZIMBABWEAN PEASANTS AND WOULD ALLOW TIME FOR A REVOLUTIONARY-MINDED LEADERSHIP TO EMERGE FROM THE FIGHTING FORCES.

16 WHETHER OR NOT MACHEL SUCCEEDS IN CREATING A FRELIMO-TYPE ORGANIZATION AMONG THE ZIMBABWEANS, WE BELIEVE MACHEL, RATHER THAN ONE OF THE OTHER THREE FRONT-LINE PRESIDENTS, WILL HAVE THE GREATEST INFLUENCE ON EVENTS IN RHODESIA. MOZAMBIQUE HAS AN EIGHT HUNDRED MILE BORDER WITH RHODESIA, MOST OF THE GUERRILLA CAMPS ARE LOCATED IN MOZAMBIQUE, MOST OF THE ARMS THAT THE GUERRILLAS RECEIVE ARE FUNNELED THROUGH THE MOZAMBIQUE ARMY, AND MACHEL CONFIDENTIAL

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IS DETERMINED TO OUST THE SMITH REGIME. IF CUBANS OR VOLUNTEERS FROM OTHER PROGRESSIVE STATES ARE ASKED TO PLAY A ROLE IN THE ZIMBABWEAN STRUGGLE, IT WILL BE MACHEL WHO MAKES THAT DECISION. CERTAINLY OVER THE SHORT-TERM, MACHEL INTENDS TO USE HIS GEOGRAPHICAL AND POLITICAL ADVANTAGES TO FURTHER HIS OWN ENDS.

17 THE FUTURE: DURING THE NEXT THREE TO EIGHTEEN MONTHS WE PREDICT THAT:
---MACHEL WILL CONTINUE TO BACK RADICAL THIRD WORLD PROPOSALS, TO ATTACK WESTERN POLICIES, AND TO MAINTAIN CLOSE RELATIONS WITH THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES:
--MOZAMBIQUE WILL NOT SEVER ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICAN UNTIL AND INDEPENDENT BLACK
GOVERNMENT IS INSTALLED IN SALISBURG AND UNTIL EXILED BLACK SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICAL PARTIES ARE SIGNIFICANTLY BETTER ORGANIZED;
--MACHEL WILL CONTINUE TO PROMOTE THE FORTUNES OF A REVOLUTIONARY LEADERSHIP FOR THE ZIMBABWEAN LIBERATION STRUGGLE AND FOR A POST-INDEPENTDENT ZIMBABWE GOVERNMENT;
--MACHEL MAY SEEK ASSISTANCE OF AFRICAN AND POSSIBLY CUBAN TROOPS TO SHORE UP HIS BORDER DEFENSES IF RHODESIA CONTINUES ITS RAIDS INTO MOZAMBIQUE OR IF RHODESIA RECRUITS A LARGE NUMBER OF MERCENARY FORCES; AND
--MACHEL WILL PRESS THE OTHER FRONT-LINE PRESIDENTS TO PERMIT OTHERS, INCLUDING THE CUBANS, TO PARTICIPATE IN THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE IF, IN HIS JUDGMENT, THE STRUGGLE IN RHODESIA IS LIKELY TO BE PROLONGED.

18. FOR ASSESSMENT OF MOZAMBIQUE'S RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. AND THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES SEE REFTELS B AND C.
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